# Approved For Release 2002/06/25: CIA-RDP89B00569R000400130001-6

UCLA-005Z 7 March 1961

25X1A	TO :	Chief of DPD		<i>3</i> *
	FROM	:		25X1A
	SUBJECT:	Commander's Repo	ort, Operation	25X1A
	Tran	numitted herewith i	is Commander's Report, Operat	tion
				25X1A
	Attachme	ent.		

25X1A

(1) Comd's Rpt, Op (TS# 160924), pages, copies 1,3,4,5,&6.

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## COMMANDER'S REPORT

		OPER	ATIC	*	
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	1. GENERAL:
25X1A 25X1A	The operation was conducted under the provisions of Headquarters Operations Order 18-60, dated 17 December 1960. Unofficial notification of the pending exercise was received on 16 December and was confirmed officially the following day. The period of deployment was 19 December 1960 to 10 February 1961. Although
25X1A	Two C-124 type aircraft were utilized to transport necessary support equipment and personnel from to the operating base at 25X1A
25X1A	The two employed for this operation were ferried from to with an intermediate stop at 25X1A
25X1A	In spite of the rapid departure soon after the return of
25X1A	The reliability of aircraft and equipment was particularly good and it would have been very easy to have supported a much heavier schedule. The Base facilities at are very good for our type operation and the weather during the period that we were there was nearly perfect.
	All stagings of this type may be considered as being divided into six different and separate phases with each being completed prior to commencing the next phase. They are preparation, deployment, setting up the Detachment, operations, closing down, and redeployment. Each of these phases moved along very smoothly and on schedule except for the deployment phase which required an excessive amount of time.
	2. THE PREPARATION PHASE was completed on schedule but was very challenging due to the limited amount of time and the large amount of work required. The following items were factors that affected preparation.
	a. Article 343 required an engine change and test hop.
25X1A	b. Article 344, at LAC, required a periodic inspection and delivery to
	c. Both articles required painting and insignias for the ferry flight.
25X1	A d required a test flight. (Had just arrived from
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	e. It was necessary to send personnel to Burbank and remove cabling rom 342 for installation ofin 344.
œ	f. All passports were not current and required a substantial amount of cordinating both here and at Headquarters.
25X1A	g. Some FAK items requisitioned after had not arrived which equired immediate pick-up for packing.
25X1A	h. Some support of was im progress.
25X1A	i. Return of equipment was in progress.
ei fi ti ai v: ei 37 or ti mi	THE DEPLOYMENT PHASE was unsatisfactory due to inadequate MATS support assed primarily from a lack of supervision and motivation on the part of MATS personnel. Hased on this experience I question the capability of MATS handle the requirements under a quick move concept. The staging return brough Midway was transported by Troop Carrier who did a much better job and from this limited experience appear much more capable of fulfilling our equirements. The first support aircraft on the deployment, which was sheduled to proceed direct to destination with only minimum delays for resertions spent more time on the ground while enroute than in the air while alloying a one - A priority. The actual flying time to destination was the of my most frustrating experiences and the fact that I stayed up for the consecutive nights in an effort to expedite didn't seem to help very such. It is true that an unusual number of difficulties were experienced, evertheless, the ground time could have been reduced substantially through coper supervision by MATS.
	Deployment of the tactical aircraft was very smooth and no difficulties are encountered except for a coordination problem on Air Rescue on the first 25X1/
as ac tì	SETTING UP THE DETACRMENT went very smoothly and gave much valuable sistance during this phase. They were obviously briefed by the Area Commander to provide what ever assistance that was required. The bulk of this stivity occurred on 24 and 25 December and it was particularly commendable not they so willingly gave of their time during the holiday period when they would have normally been off

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5. THE OPERATIONAL PHASE, the real pay off for the entire effort, was very smooth and with a minimum of complications. The only difficulty of any consequence was the presence of contrails at operating altitudes on the first two sorties which resulted in air aborts. The pre-mission weather forecasts were very accurate as to their presence including the altitudes.

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After the fuel load and mission duration was reduced to enable the Driver to get on top on the third and subsequent missions the remainder of five missions were completed as briefed. Pin point navigation in the area of interest was difficult due to cloud cover, terrain, and inaccuracies in the maps. Aircraft and equipment reliability was exceptionally good with no serious malfunctions occurring on any of the missions. A recap of the sorties flown is as follows:

## a. FERRY SORTIES:

8 flown

66:30 hours flown

O late take offs

0 ground aborts

O air aborts

#### b. OPERATIONAL SORTIES:

7 flown

46:35 hours flown

O late take offs

0 ground aborts

- O air aborts for equipment
- 2 air aborts for contrails

5 successful

2 unsuccessful

#### c. TEST HOPS (Operational Checks):

6 flown

10:20 hours flown

O late take offs

0 ground aborts

O air aborts

The motivation of the Drivers and the desire to complete the missions as briefed was all that could have been expected. As Detachment Commander I was well pleased with the initiative, teamwork and individual efforts of all personnel to make each mission a success. The preparation, launch, execution and post mission requirements were handled in a professional manner with each man knowing his job, and fulfilling his individual requirements with a minimum of supervision,

6. CLOSING DOWN THE DETACHNESS is always the simplest and most easily accomplished of all phases of the operation. The reason for this is obvious

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because invariably every one is so anxious to complete the preparation for departure that they accomplish their work faster than under most any other circumstances. Also, those who finish first will usually pitch in and help others without being asked. In my estimation the most important concept to follow is to insure that the area is left in better condition than it was received. It has been noted from past experience that a return to the same location receives a much warmer welcome if everything was left in excellent conditon on the previous exercise.

25X1A	7. REDEPLOYMENT from necessity was long and drawn out after difficulty was	25X1/
25X1A	experienced with Article 351 at The staging team from to to	
	the forecast arrival time as submitted on the departure report from	25X1A
	This support was provided by Troop Carrier Command. The return flight of	
	the main body seemed unnecessarily slow and was a source of minor irritation	25X1A
25X1A	to the personnel involved. The arrival report for the ferry flight from	
	as not received at for four hours and ten minutes.	
	This delayed the departure of the C-124 and as a result the crew would not	
	go beyond Guam until after a fifteen hour crew rest. It was also necessary	
	to orew rest at every stop on the way back. Certainly, the speed of the	
	return trip home is of far less importance than the trip over but for future	
	considerations if they could be set up with minimum delays it would be much	
	appreciated by the personnel involved.	

8. SECURITY: was considered very good on this exercise. The area utilized by the Detachment was on the opposite side of the field from most of the activity. An aircraft carrier was docked close by our area and the aircraft were parked on the same side of the field, however the ramp was at a much lower elevation and a high bank served to obstruct the view of most of our activity. Base personnel had been theroughly indoctrinated in keeping clear of our area and were very cooperative in all matters pertaining to security. Personal film exposed during the period of TDY for all personnel was held until after our departure by order of the Base Commander. It was rumored that a truck load had been accumulated during the period. Road blocks were used to restrict all traffic into our area at any time that preparations were being made to launch or recover an aircraft. Guards with dogs were employed by the Base at night to restrict movement into our area in addition to the normal security measures employed by the Detachment.

A large amount of overtime was accumulated by security personnel during this exercise. Due to the courier requirements there was only one Detachment security man present a considerable portion of the time. It would seem advisable to plan on utilizing one or two more personnel in this section with lower GS ratings from the standpoint of cost and improved coverage.

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9. <u>INTACHMENT MANNING</u> was very good considering the limited time in preparation and the limited knowledge of the Base of operation. The manning consisted of five Officers, thirty-six Civilians (including five Drivers), and two Airmen. For future planning, as previously mentioned, it seems advisable to include two more security personnel of lower ratings to reduce the amount of overtime for a OS-13, 12 and 11. Also, a clerk could have been fully utilised and it is desirable for future TDYs of this duration to include the Medical Officer,

10. RESUPPLY is always an important factor and excessive requirements of

- any important items that necessitate requisitions from the Depot is a matter of serious cencern to the Detachment Commander. On a somewhat similar type deployment a year age in another Organization after taking five C-124 leads of personnel and equipment it was necessary to order a far greater number of supplies than on this Detachment which indicates that the thirty day package used on this deployment is a pretty good one. Even so it is impossible to anticipate all requirements and limited resupply of certain items will probably always be required. All requisitions were handled promptly and expediteiously by both and the deliveries came through as promptly as could be expected. We were never in serious trouble for the lack of an item, but we were able to help by securing a few common items locally and stateside requisitions were held to the absolute minimum. Both articles were always in commission with no ACCPS.
  - 11. PROBLEM AREAS of any consequence were very few on this operation. In addition to the items previously mentioned the following are submitted for future consideration:
  - a. Courier procedures required considerable clarification by message and it would have been helpful to have had them spelled out in more detail in the Ops Order. Also, the large metal containers with sharp edges were objectionable on passenger flights and the couriers received some argument along this line on every flight. It may be advisable to build a wooden box for the metal containers to avoid future difficulties.
  - b. <u>Mail deliveries</u> were very unsatisfactory and since this is an important morale factor improved procedures should be used for future lengthy deployments if possible.
- 25X1A c. <u>coordination</u> required considerable clarification by message.

  More detailed information should be included in the Ops Order or in an all inclusive message.
  - d. Passports were not current and required considerable processing in order to prepare them for departure. New procedures recently stablished should rectify or at least minimize future difficulties.

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	12. RECOMMENDATIONS and factors for future consideration:
25X1A	a. Dispatch Ops Order ASAP after deployment requirement is levied. (No doubt this was done on but even hours help with critical time factor)
	b. Allow as much time for preparation as possible.
>//	c. Follow need to know concept more rigidly on deployment location particularly for Headquarters personnel joining the Detachment.
25X1A	d. Levy requirement for to maintain current passports. (This has been done).
	e. Insure better coordination on Air Rescue support on ferry flights.
	f. Shorten routes on Operational Missions to enable Driver to get on top of contrails if this appears to be a factor based on forecasts.
√ · 25X1A ·	g. Provide more detailed instructions to be followed on procedures for processing of take. This was not a problem for the Detachment but appeared to be for
25X1A	h. Include resupply procedures as part of the Ops Order.
	i. Establish a better procedure for sending and receiving mail. Suggest that mail from families be mailed to thebox (735) and then accumulated, forwarded as one package to the project officer at the TDY location with the address provided by the Detachment after arrival. The return mail could be handled in the same manner and posted as separate letters for delivery by
25X1A [	j. Consideration be given to a small increase in personnel manning of to avoid the necessity in so far as possible of sending the same personnel on every exercise. This could develop into a serious morale problem if deployments continue to occur at frequent intervals.

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